![]() Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. ![]() My aim is both to showcase the variety and sophistication of Husserl's reasons for thinking perceptual experience is inadequate and to problematize that idea.Īrguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. ![]() Here, I reconstruct four arguments for the conclusion that perceptual experience is inadequately found in various of Husserl's writings and critically evaluated them. To the extent that perceptual experience makes things available to us in a non-sensory mode, Husserl calls it inadequate. We may experience, for instance, an object's facing surface in a sensory mode and, as part of the same perceptual experience, also that object's out-of-view surface in a non-sensory mode. Edmund Husserl maintains that there is also a significant non-sensory side to perception's phenomenal character. Some philosophers nevertheless suggest this sensory phenomenal character does not exhaust the way things are made manifest to us in perceptual experience. One key difference between perceptual experience and thought is the distinctly sensory way perception presents things to us. We discuss views on which the perspectival aspect of perception is analyzed in terms of constitutively mind-dependent appearance properties as well as views on which the perspectival aspect of perception is analyzed in terms of representations of mind-independent perspectival properties. ![]() How should we account for the perspectival aspect of spatial perception? We present a framework within which to discuss the perspectival aspect of perception and put forward three desiderata that any account of the perspectival aspect of perception should satisfy. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect-an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective-and a perspectival aspect-an aspect that changes depending on one's perspective on the object. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. ![]()
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